DETERRENCE TO HIRING ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT WORKERS: WILL THE
NEW EMPLOYER SANCTION PROVISIONS WORK?
Stephanie E. Steele*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION .........................................

477

II.

BACKGROUND: IMMIGRATION-PAST LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS ....
A. The UnitedStates: HistoricalPerspective .................
B. The United Kingdom: HistoricalPerspective ...............

482
482
483

III. INTRODUCTION OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS ....................
A. The United States's and UnitedKingdom 's Perspectives .....
1. Statutes ..........................................
2. Supporters .......................................
3. Critics ..........................................
B. Overview of United States Sanctions: IRCA of 1986 .........
C. Overview of United Kingdom Sanctions:Asylum and
ImmigrationAct 1996 .................................

484
484
484
485
485
486

IV. ANALYSIS: NEW IMMIGRATION REFORM ACTS ................
A. Why the IRCA of l986DidNot Work .....................
1. Sanctions Not Substantial ...........................
2. Enforcement Issues ................................
a. Lack of Enforcement .............................
b. Inefficiency in Enforcement .......................
c. Lack of Experience by the INS .....................
d Non-Uniformity of Enforcement ....................
3. Employer Issues ...................................
4. Complexity of the Problem ..........................
5. Document Fraud ..................................
6. Discrimination ....................................

492
492
493
493
493
494
494
495
495
496
497
497

489

* J.D., University ofGeorgia School of Law, 2008; M.B.A., Georgia State University, 2004;

B.S., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2002.

475

476

V.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 36:475

B. Why the Asylum Act DidNot Work .......................
1. Lack of Enforcement ...............................
2. Fraud ...........................................
3. DiscriminatoryEffect ..............................
4. BroadList ofAcceptable Documents ..................
5. Burden Upon Employers ............................
6. Lack ofAdequate Data .............................
C. What Now-The United States and UnitedKingdom
IntroduceNew Legislation .............................
1. United States-H.R. 4437 and S. 1348 .................
2. United Kingdom-Immigration,Asylum, and
NationalityAct 2006 ...............................
D. Which One Will Be More Successful? ....................
1. U S. Bills ........................................
a. H.R. 4437 .....................................
b. S.1348 .......................................
2. UK Act ..........................................

498
498
498
499
499
500
500

CONCLUSION .............................................

508

501
501
502
503
503
503
505
506

2008]

DETERRENCE TO HIRING ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT WORKERS

477

I. INTRODUCTION

As the world moved into the twenty-first century, both the United States
and the United Kingdom experienced an influx of illegal immigrants.'
Estimates indicate that "the number of illegal immigrants in the United States
has grown to as many as 12 million, and they now account for about one in
every 20 workers." 2 Since 2000, illegal immigrants have been entering the
United States at an approximate rate of 850,000 per year.3 Of the 12 million
illegal immigrants currently in the United States, about 7.2 million are
undocumented workers. 4 The United Kingdom has also faced the problem of
illegal immigration.5 There are approximately 500,000 illegal immigrants in
the United Kingdom.6
Several possible explanations have emerged for the growing number of
undocumented workers who are illegal immigrants in these countries.7 In the
United States, some factors that "pull" illegal immigrants into the country are
"employment opportunities, higher wages, improved working conditions, and
a higher standard of living." 8 Possible explanations for increased illegal
immigration into the United Kingdom include the changing British
immigration control environment concerning the gradual removal of border
controls and the increasing "employer demand for labor migration at all skill
levels." 9 Coupled with "push" factors in the illegal immigrant's home country

' Maria Isabel Medina, The CriminalizationoflImmigrationLaw: EmployerSanctions and
MarriageFraud,5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 669 (1997).
2 Stephen Ohlemacher, Number of Illegal Immigrants Hits 12M, AssocIATED PRESS,
Mar. 7, 2006, available at http://www.breitbart.comlarticle.php?id=D8G6U2KO8&showarti
cle= 1.Estimates show that illegal immigrants "fill a quarter of all agricultural jobs, 17 percent
of office and house cleaning positions, 14 percent of construction jobs and 12 percent in food
preparation." Id.
3Id.
4 Id.
David Leppard & Robert Winnett, 500,000 IllegalMigrants,Says Home Office, SUNDAY
TIMES (U.K.), Apr. 17, 2005, availableat http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article38
2035.ece.
6 Id.This figure "includes not only migrants who have illegally entered Britain to work in
the black market but also failed asylum seekers who should have been deported." Id.
7 Kathleen M. Johnson, Coping with Illegal Immigrant Workers: Federal Employer
Sanctions, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 959 (1984) (noting several forces explaining illegal immigration
in the United States); Bernard Ryan, The Evolving Legal Regime on Unauthorized Work by
Migrants in Britain, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 27, 30-31 (2005) (noting examples of forces
explaining illegal immigration in the United Kingdom).
8 Johnson, supra note 7, at 959.
9 Ryan, supra note 7, at 31.
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such as "high unemployment, low wages, poor living conditions, and highly
skewed income," these factors help to drive the immigrants into the more
attractive labor markets of the United States and the United Kingdom.l"
Immigration has become a hot issue in recent years for several reasons.
First, "with terrorism currently the chief policy concern of the United States,
immigration issues play an increasingly important role on the American
national security agenda."" Further, citizens increasingly view illegal
immigration as a cause of crime and job displacement. 2 Illegal immigration
leads to job displacement by providing "a cheap labor pool for employers,
which discourages employers from improving working conditions."' 3 Finally,
in the United Kingdom, the "evidence both of unauthorized work.., and of its
has resulted in "unauthorized work"
taking place in exploitative conditions"
4
being the focus of recent attention.'
In response to the growing concern over the hiring of illegal immigrants,
both the United States and the United Kingdom passed immigration reform
legislation.'" In 1986, the United States passed the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA) 6 The primary goal of this legislation was to slow the
influx of illegal immigrants into the country based on the theory that if
employment is no longer available, illegal immigrants "will be less likely to
enter."' 17 Thus, the main provision in this Act addresses the control of the
unlawful employment of aliens.' 8 This provision states that "[i]t is unlawful
for a person or other entity to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for

10

Johnson, supra note 7, at 959.

Jeffrey L. Ehrenpreis, Note, Controlling Our Borders Through Enhanced Employer
Sanctions,79 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1203 (2006).
12 Michael J. Mayerle, Comment, Proposed Guest Worker Statutes: An Unsatisfactory
Answer to a Difficult, If Not Impossible, Question, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 559, 560
(2002).
3 Cecelia M. Espenoza, The IllusoryProvisionsofSanctions: The ImmigrationReform and
ControlAct of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343, 350 (1994).
'4 Ryan, supra note 7, at 27.
15 Ehrenpreis, supranote 11, at 1205-07 (addressing U.S. efforts through the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, which authorized civil sanctions and criminal penalties for
knowingly hiring unauthorized workers); Ryan, supra note 7, at 35 (addressing the UK efforts
through the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, which introduced criminal offenses for
employers of unauthorized workers).
16 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
17 Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, EmployerSanctions: INS EnforcementPoliciesandProcedures,
515 PRACTISING L. INST. 437, 447 (Nov. 1994).
"s 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2000 & Supp. 2004).
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employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized
alien."'1 9
In 1996, the United Kingdom passed the Asylum and Immigration Act
(Asylum Act).2' The main purpose of this legislation was also to curb the entry
of illegal immigrants seeking work in the United Kingdom. 21 The main
provision of the Act, noted in section eight, states that "if any person ("the
employer") employs a person subject to immigration control ("the employee")
who has attained the age of 16, the employer shall be guilty of an
offence.
"22
Following the passage of these acts, employers, for the first time, were
subject to sanctions for hiring illegal immigrants. 23 The governments of both
countries saw the implementation of sanctions as a deterrent to businesses
hiring unauthorized workers.2 4 An immigration study concluded that "strong
enforcement of immigration laws and tough sanctions can effectively reduce
illegal immigration. ,25 In that study, six countries were compared and
analyzed to determine what effect their current immigration policies had on
minimizing the flow of illegal immigrants.26 Japan punished employers of
illegal immigrants the most severely with a maximum prison penalty of three
years and as a result, has had one of the smallest illegal immigration problems
of all the countries surveyed.27 Japan, which views illegal immigration as

Id. § 1324a(1)(A).
Ryan, supra note 7, at 35.
21 Id.; see TheLawyer.Com, Asylum Act: Checks and Balances for Workers, Feb. 18, 1997,
19

20

http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=92776 [hereinafter Asylum Act]. This Act is
"regarded by many as a cynical attempt by the Government to turn employers into immigration
officers by placing employers under a statutory duty to check the status of all job applicants."

Id.

22Asylum and Immigration Act, 1996, c. 49, § 8 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.
uk/acts/acts1996/1996049.htm; Asylum Act, supra note 21. " 'Subject to immigration
control' ... means any person who does not have to leave to live or work in the UK." Id.
23 Ryan, supra note 7, at 35.
24 Der-Yeghiayan, supra note 17, at 445-47; Ryan, supra note 7, at 35-37.
25 News Advisory, Chairman, U.S. House of Rep. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sensenbrenner
Releases Report of Immigration (May 5, 2006), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/
pdfs/lawlibrreportrelease5506.pdf.
26 DIRECTORATE OF LEGAL RES. FOR INT'L, COMP., AND FOREIGN LAW, THE LAW
LIBRARY

OF CONG., IMMIGRATION LAW SANCTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT IN SELECTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES

(2006) (comparing Brazil, Egypt, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, and Switzerland based on the
incidence of illegal immigration and its root causes as well as the sanctions of immigration law
and the level of enforcement), availableat http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/lawlibrimmre
port5506.pdf.
27 Id. at 2.
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harmful, also has a substantial level of enforcement which has contributed to
a large decrease in illegal immigration over the past decade. 8 This study
illustrates the importance of employer sanctions.2 9 Due to the failure of
previous immigration legislation passed in the United States and the United
Kingdom, both countries have introduced new legislation containing stiffer
penalties as a means to curb the number of illegal immigrants employed in
both countries.30
In recent years, both houses of Congress have passed legislation in response
to the continuing influx of illegal immigrants into the United States.31 The
House of Representatives passed reform bill H.R. 4437, entitled the "Border
Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005. ' '32
This bill was passed on December 16, 2005, by a vote of 239 to 182." 3 The
Senate passed reform bill S.2611, entitled the "Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Act of 2006" and is considering reform bill S. 1348, entitled the
"Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007."3 The first Senate bill was
passed on May 25, 2006 by a vote of sixty-two to thirty-six.3 5 The second bill
failed to come to the full Senate for a vote.36
28 Id. at
29

3.
See generally id.

30 George W. Bush, President of the United States, Address to the United States Chamber

of Commerce on Comprehensive Immigration Reform (June 1, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060601.html) (stressing the importance
of holding employers accountable for the workers that they hire and requiring more severe
penalties for those violating the laws); Tom Henry, Senators Agree on Tougher Rules Against
Hiring Illegal Immigrants, JURIST, May 10, 2006 (displaying U.S. Senators' agreement to
toughen rules and sanctions in illegal immigrant employment), availableat http://jurist.law.pitt.
edu/paperchase/2006/05/senators-agree-on-tougher-rules.php; Brett Murphy, UK Government
Weighing Sanctions on Companies Employing Illegal Immigrants, JURIST, July 16, 2006,
availableat http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/07/uk-govemment-weighing-sanctionson.php.
"' See Henry, supra note 30.
32 H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005), availableathttp://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdque
ry/z?d109:HR04437:@@@L&summ2=m&.
33Library of Congress, All Actions on H.R. 4437, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d109:HR04437:@@@S (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
14 S.2611, 109th Cong. (2006), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dlO
9:SN02611 :@@@L&summ2=m&; S.1348, 110th Cong. (2007), availableathttp://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c 110:7:./temp/-c 11OtD5DUb::.
" Library of Congress, All Actions on S.2611, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d
109:SN02611 :@@@S (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
36 See GovTrack.us, S.1348: Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, http://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s 110-1348 (last visited Mar. 24,2008). Both H.R. 4437 and
S.2611 failed to become law. The bills were approved in a previous session of Congress, but
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The United Kingdom has also recently strengthened its immigration laws.
Parliament passed the Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Act 2006 in an
attempt to more adequately address the problem of businesses hiring illegal
immigrants.37
Both the United States and the United Kingdom have taken active measures
to try to address illegal immigration through recent legislation. This Note will
show that increasing employer sanctions through enhanced civil sanctions and
criminal penalties is a necessary tactic to reduce the influx of illegal
immigrants working in the United States. Employer sanctions must be severe
enough so that the risk of the employer being caught outweighs the benefit of
hiring illegal immigrants. In order for new immigration reform legislation to
be successful and to meet the goal of reducing unauthorized work, it is critical
that the penalties be steep and the laws strictly enforced.
When comparing both of the U.S. bills against the UK act, the U.S. bills are
better geared toward reducing the number of illegal immigrants working. The
U.S. bills have instituted harsher civil sanctions and criminal penalties, and
have addressed the growing problem of the use of fraudulent documents. The
UK act is lacking in all of these areas.
This Note will analyze the current immigration reform legislation of the
United States and the United Kingdom to determine which legislation would
be the most effective in meeting the goal of reducing the number of illegal
immigrants working for businesses. Part II of the Note will provide a brief
overview of past immigration reform of both countries leading up to the
passing of the IRCA of 1986 and the Asylum Act. Part III of this Note will
analyze both countries initial attempts to control illegal immigrants working
through the introduction of employer sanctions in the IRCA and the Asylum
Act. Part IV of this Note will discuss why the previous legislation was not
successful in curbing the number of illegal immigrants working. This part will
also analyze two U.S. bills, H.R. 4377 and S. 1348, and the United Kingdom's

both died in conference because the House and Senate were unable to agree on compromise
legislation. However, the text of S. 1348 concerning unlawful employment of aliens is identical
to the text of S. 2611. Therefore, going forward, this Note will focus on the text of H.R. 4437
See also GovTrack.us, H.R. 4437 [109th]: Border Protection,
compared to S. 1348.
Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=h109-4437 (last visited Mar. 24, 2008); GovTrack.us, S. 2611 [109th]:
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bil
l=s109-2611 (last visited Mar. 24, 2008). At the time of publication both the House and Senate
bills have failed to become law.
37 Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Act, 2006, c. 13, §§ 15-22 (Eng.), availableat
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060013_en.pdf.
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immigration act, the Immigration, Asylum & Nationality Act 2006, to
determine which legislation will be more successful. Part V of this Note will
provide final conclusions on the effectiveness and potential success of both
pieces of legislation.
II. BACKGROUND: IMMIGRATION-PAST LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
A. The United States: HistoricalPerspective
The immigration policies of the United States can be grouped into three
periods.38 The first is the period before 1875 when there were minimal
restrictions on immigration.39 A major piece of legislation related to
immigration was the Alien and Sedition Act of 1789, which provided the first
federal statutory limitation on immigration.4"
The second is the period from 1875-1965 which, due to the dramatic
increase in immigrants into the country, was "marked with anti-alien
sentiment."4" Therefore, during this period U.S. immigration policies involved
restrictionist criteria.42
The most considerable pieces of federal legislation passed during this
period were the Chinese Exclusion Laws of 1882, 1884, and 1892. 4 ' For the
first time in U.S. history, the country tried to restrict an entire nationality from
38 Jennie Morales, Immigration Reform: Will the Immigration Reform and ControlAct of

1986 Accomplish its Goals?, 17 S.U. L. REV. 265, 266 (1990).
19 Id. at 266.
40 Id. "[T]he nation did not devote much attention to immigration until after the Civil War
when three important events occurred"-the passing of the Civil Rights Act in 1870 that
guaranteed equal protection under the law for aliens; the Supreme Court case of Minor v.
Harpsett in 1874 which held that states had the right to permit aliens to vote; and the Supreme
Court case of Henderson v. City of New York in 1875 which held that regulation of immigration
was a federal prerogative under the Interstate Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
41 Id. at 267.
42 Id. During this period various states attempted to pass laws to restrict immigration by

providing for a tax on each immigrant. Id. However, the Supreme Court held that "these state
head tax laws were unconstitutional in violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution" because "the passage of laws which concerned the admission of citizens and
subjects of foreign nations belongs to Congress and not to the state." Id.
4' Id. at 267. These laws were the first immigration statutes to be subjected to judicial
scrutiny. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). This case established
two important precedents; first, the practice was initiated whereby immigration laws were relaxed
when it came to desirable immigrants; second, restrictive provisions were invoked when it was
deemed necessary to exclude selective immigrants on a permanent basis. Morales, supra
note 38, at 268.
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entering the country.' Later, in 1921, Congress passed the "Quota Law"
which placed a restriction on the number of immigrants entering the country.4 5
The restrictions were based on national origin with a preference being given
to nations that were well represented in the United States.46 In 1952, Congress
passed the Immigration and Nationality Act that served as a major change to
immigration law.47 Another major change was the abolishment of the national
origin criterion in 1965 in favor of a system focused on employment skills and
family reunification.4 8
The third major immigration era is the period from 1965 to the present.49
In 1980, Congress enacted the "Refigee Act" as an "attempt to reestablish
Congressional control over the number of refugees admitted every year." 50 As
a result of increasing pressure on the country to control the flow of illegal
immigrants, Congress began discussing proposals that eventually led to the
passage of the IRCA of 1986."'
B. The United Kingdom: HistoricalPerspective
Prior to 1905, the United Kingdom was not overly concerned with the
number of illegal immigrants that were entering the country." However, since
then the United Kingdom has enacted legislation to try to control illegal
immigration.53 The first major piece of legislation was the 1905 Immigration
Act.54 This act required the illegal immigrant "to register their presence on

44 Morales, supra note 38, at 267.
45 Id. at 268.
46

Paul L. Frantz, UndocumentedWorkers: State Issuance of DriverLicenses Would Create

a ConstitutionalConundrum, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 515 (2004).
47 Id.
48 Id.
41 Morales, supranote 38, at 269. "In 1964, there was a new wave of illegal aliens [which]
was in part due to the termination of... the Western Hemisphere Quota." This quota placed a
limit on the number of immigrants from countries such as Mexico. Id.
50 Id. at 269-70. "The refugee flow was exacerbated by other developments like the Cuban
refugees of the 1970s, followed by the Indo Chinese in 1975 and in 1978 with the influx of the
Vietnamese people." Id.
"' Id. at 270.
12 Peter Tompkins, Immigration:Governments andLawyers on a CollisionCourse, 17 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 891, 892-93 (1995).
53 Id.

4 Id; Aliens Act, 1905, 5 Edw. 7, c. 13 (Eng.).
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arrival."" This law was "aimed at denying access to 'undesirable' foreigners
from outside the British Empire. ..
The next set of immigration legislation occurred in the 1960s with the
passage of the Commonwealth Immigrant Act 1962. 57 This Act was passed in
response to Britain's concern over possible large-scale immigration from
former British colonies.5 8 Citizens whose passports were not directly issued
by the United Kingdom government became subject to immigration control.59
In the 1970s, the United Kingdom passed the Immigration Act 1971 .60 This
new Act "put in place a more comprehensive structure for immigrants
generally.",6 ' The British Nationality Act 1981 attempted to further "narrow
immigration by limiting the right of residency exclusively to those in
possession of British citizenship."6 2 Finally, the United Kingdom enacted the
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act of 1993 .63 This Act granted a refugee
the right of appeal.'
III. INTRODUCTION OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS

A. The United States 's and United Kingdom 's Perspectives
1. Statutes
The main purpose of the United States's IRCA of 1986 was to "stem the
flow of illegal immigration into the United States."6 5 The main purpose of the
" Geoffrey Care, The Judiciary, The State, and the Refugee: The Evolution of Judicial
Protection in Asylum-A U.K. Perspective,28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1421, 1429 (2005).
56 Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah & Francesca Hopwood Road, United Kingdom: Rising
Numbers, Rising Anxieties, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE, May, 2005 (quoting Aliens Act, 1905,
5 Edw. 7, c. 13 (Eng.)), availableat http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?
ID=306. Undesirables included paupers, lunatics, vagrants and prostitutes. Id.
57

Id.

58 Id.

"9 Id. This Act introduced "a new legal distinction between the rights of UK-born and UK
passport-holders, and the rights of those who held passports issued by former British colonies."
Id.
60 Care, supra note 55, at 1430.
61 Id.; see also Sriskandarajah & Road, supra note 56. This act favored individuals of
"British stock" including immigrants from Canada, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia.
It "also limited admission of certain family members of UK citizens." Id,
62 See Sriskandarajah & Road, supranote 56.
63 Care, supra note 55, at 1431.
64 Id.
65 Der-Yeghiayan, supra note 17, at 447.
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United Kingdom's Asylum Act was "not solely to control political asylum
applicants" but rather was as an attempt to control all immigrants coming into
the United Kingdom.66
Both of these acts were different from previous legislation in two respects.
First, this was the first time that either country had introduced employer
sanctions for hiring illegal immigrants.67 Second, in addition to providing for
civil sanctions, both acts provided for criminal penalties.6 8
The use of employer sanctions in both the United States and the United
Kingdom has drawn public discourse from both supporters and critics.
2. Supporters
Supporters of employer sanctions typically argue that "if employers are
allowed to employ unauthorized aliens with impunity, aliens will continue" to
flow into the country.69 To effectively deter unauthorized entry, the goal of
entry-employment-must be removed.7" Therefore, the way to deter
unauthorized entry is to prohibit the employment of illegal immigrants and to
sanction the employers who hire them.7 1
3. Critics
Critics of employer sanctions typically raise three objections.72 The first
is that job opportunities are not the sole reason for illegal immigration,73 and
therefore, the influx of illegal immigrants will continue despite the use of
employer sanctions.74 Second, "if illegal workers typically take the jobs that
legal workers reject" then the use of sanctions poses a threat of eliminating a
necessary work force.75 Lastly, the use of employer sanctions is too costly.76
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) predicted that it would cost
66 Workpermit.com, Employers Liabilities Under Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration
Act 1996, http://www.workpermit.com/uk/workpermit/liabilities.htm (last visited Mar. 18,
2008) [hereinafter Employers Liabilities].
67 Ryan,
68 Id.

supranote 7, at 36.

69 Medina,
70

supra note 1, at 678.

Id.

71 Id.

" Johnson, supra note 7, at 964.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76

Id.
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U.S. employers approximately $182,250,000 per year to comply with the
IRCA's provisions regarding verification forms and the storage of the
completed documents.77
Critics of the Asylum Act have three main arguments.78 First, the employer
sanctions will have a negative impact upon ethnic minorities even though the
majority of them are legal residents of the United Kingdom.79 Second, the new
system risks employer discrimination in an attempt to avoid liability.80 Third,
the employer sanctions excessively burden the employers.8 '
B. Overview of United States Sanctions: IRCA of 1986
"The employer sanction provisions of IRCA apply to all employers who
employ workers in the United States, as well as persons or [government and
private] entities who recruit such workers or refer them for a fee."8 2 With
regard to employees, the Act "applies to every employee, whether full time,
part time, casual, temporary or personal."83
The offenses under the Act are classified as either substantive or procedural
offenses.8 4 A substantive offense occurs when the employer either hires, or
continues to employ an illegal alien with knowledge of the worker's
unauthorized status.85 A procedural offense is the result of failure to comply
with the employee documentation verification process.8 6

" Der-Yeghiayan, supra note 17, at 449.
78 Ryan, supra note 7, at 36.
79 Id.

80Id.
81 Id.
82

Aaron Schwabach, Employer Sanctions andDiscrimination:The Casefor Repeal ofthe

Employer Sanctions Provisionsofthe ImmigrationReform andControlAct of1986,4 LA RAZA
L.J. 1, 3 (1991).
83 Morales, supranote 38, at 273; Francis A. Gabor, The Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986: An Analysis in the Light ofContemporaryInternationalLaw, 23 INT'L L. 485,488
(1989). "The IRCA prohibits the employment of aliens who are unauthorized to work in the
United States because they either entered the country illegally, or have an immigration status that
does not permit employment." Id.
8 Mayerle, supra note 12, at 567.
85 M. Isabel Medina, Employer Sanctions in the United States, Canada, and Mexico:
Exploringthe CriminalizationofImmigration Law, 3 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 333, 341 (1996);
see Collins Foods Int'l v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 555 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating the "knowing"
requirement incorporates a constructive knowledge standard, which should be sparingly applied
so that employers are not forced to avoid hiring a person with a foreign appearance).
86 Medina, supra note 85, at 341.
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The IRCA of 1986 has three main provisions dealing with the unlawful
employment of aliens. These provisions make it: (1) unlawful to hire, recruit
or refer for a fee an alien with the knowledge that the alien is unauthorized; (2)
unlawful to continue to employ an alien knowing that the alien either is or has
become unauthorized; and, (3) unlawful to fail to comply with document
verification requirements during the hiring process. 7 The knowledge
requirement in the statute is defined as "knowledge which may fairly be
inferred through notice of certain facts and circumstances which would lead
a person, through the exercise of reasonable care, to know about a certain
condition.""8
The IRCA establishes both civil and criminal penalties for violation of "any
of [the] three prohibited activities." 8 9 Violators are also subject to cease and
desist orders by the INS. 90 For a first time violator, the civil penalties range
from $250 to $2,000 for each unauthorized alien. 91 For a second offense, the
civil penalties range from to $2,000 to $5,000 for each unauthorized alien. 92
For the third offense and any subsequent violations, the civil fines range from
$3,000 to $10,000 for each unauthorized alien. 93 The civil penalties for
paperwork violations range from $100 to $1,000 per worker.94
Criminal penalties cannot be greater than a $3,000 fine per worker,
imprisonment for up to six months, or both.95 Employers can also be enjoined
for a pattern or practice of employment of illegal workers.9 6 Pattern or practice
is defined as "regular, repeated and intentional activities that do not include
sporadic or accidental acts." 97

To determine the amount of the civil penalties, five factors are considered.
They are "the size of the employer's business, the employer's good faith, the
violation's seriousness, whether the employee in question is in fact an
unauthorized alien, and the history of previous employer violations." 98
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
Mayerle, supra note 12, at 567.
9 Michael Crocenzi, IRCA-Related Discrimination:Is it Time to Repeal the Employer
Sanctions?,96 DICK. L. REv. 673,677 (1992); Gabor, supranote 83, at 488 (both the employer
and the employee are subject to penalties for perjury for false certification).
90 Crocenzi, supra note 89, at 677-78.
9' 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(i).
92 Id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(ii).
93 Id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(iii).
14 Id. § 1324a(e)(5).
87
88

" Id. § 1324a(f)(1).

Id. § 1324a(f)(2).
" Crocenzi, supra note 89, at 678.
9' Thomas C. Green & Ileana M. Ciobanu, Deputizing- and then Prosecuting- America's
96
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Under the IRCA, employers are required to verify the work eligibility of
every employee.99 This requirement is satisfied through the preparation and
maintenance of an 1-9 form for each employee hired.'00 On this verification
form, the employer is confirming that the "relevant documents were physically
1
examined and [that] the employee is not an undocumented alien."''
Several different documents may be used to verify work authorization:
"documents establishing work authorization, documents attesting to identity,
and documents proving both work authorization and identity."'0 2 They include
a "(1) U.S. passport; (2) certificates of U.S. citizenship; (3) certificates of
naturalization; (4) unexpired foreign passports endorsed for work
authorization; [and] (5) permanent resident alien cards, which are photo
identification cards. . "..".0' Once this information has been collected and
recorded, the employer must then keep the completed 1-9 form "for at least
'three years from the date of hire,' or 'one year after the date of termination,
whichever date is later.' "i During investigations of an employer's hiring of
illegal aliens, the employer must readily present the I-9.1"5
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (USICE) is the
government agency that investigates and enforces employer sanctions.'0 6 The
procedures that are used by the agency vary from region to region.0 7 Some of
the offices use a regulatory investigative process to detect violations while
other offices use a "workplace survey" process in which undocumented

Businesses in the Fight Against Illegal Immigration, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1203, 1208-09
(2006).
99 Susan H. Welin, Note, The Effect of Employer Sanctions on Employment Discrimination
and Illegal Immigration, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 249, 256 (1989).
100 Id.

101

Steven M. Kaplan, The Employer Sanctions Provision of the IRCA: Deterrence of

Discrimination?,6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 545, 548 (1992).
102

Id.

103 Id.

" Welin, supra note 99, at 256.
'05 Id. at 256-57.
106

Konrad Batog, Note, ImmigrationPolicy v. LaborPolicy: An analysisofthe Application

of Domestic Labor Laws to Unauthorized Foreign Workers, 3 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L.

REv. 117, 119 (2005). The Immigration and Naturalization Service handled legal and illegal
immigration and naturalization. However, it ceased to exist as a whole entity in March 2003.
Most of its functions were transferred to three new agencies within the newly created Department
of Homeland Security. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is one of the agencies that
has now assumed the functions of the defunct Immigration and Naturalization Service. U.S.
Immigration and Custom Enforcement, About Us, http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 18, 2008).
107

Schwabach, supra note 82, at 5.
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workers are apprehended and the employers are fined.' Some of the offices
make employers the primary target of sanction enforcement while others use
sanction enforcement to identify undocumented workers.0 9 Once a violation
is detected, the agency issues a Notice of Intent to Fine."' The employer has
an opportunity to request a hearing within thirty days upon receipt of the
notice.1 ' The final order given at this hearing may be appealed to a U.S. Court
of Appeals within forty-five days." 2
Employers may assert an affirmative defense against the claim that they
knowingly hired an undocumented worker." 3 According to the statute, "a
person or entity that establishes that it has complied in good faith with the
requirements . . . with respect to the hiring, recruiting, or referral for

employment.., has established an affirmative defense that the person or entity
has not violated" the statute." 4
C. Overview of UnitedKingdomSanctions:Asylum andlmmigrationAct 1996
The Asylum Act applies to all employers that use workers age sixteen" " or
older unless "that person has current and valid permission to be in the United
Kingdom and that permission does not prevent him or her from taking the job
in question; or the person comes into the category specified by the Home
Secretary where such employment is allowed." ' 1 6 This Act "applies equally

108

Id.

109 Id.
110

Id.

i11
Id.
112

Id.

11 Medina, supra note 1, at 683; see Maka v. U.S. I.N.S., 904 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating good faith defense not available to employer who failed to complete the verification form
for unauthorized alien, and reliance on counsel does not constitute a good faith defense).
1148 U.S.C. § 1324a(3) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
"1 Asylum and Immigration Act, 1996, c. 49, § 8(1) (Eng.).
116 Border & Immigration Agency, Law and Policy, http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/lawa
ndpolicy/preventingillegalworking/codeofpractice/fullcode (last visited Nov. 12, 2007). This
section does not apply to the employment of British citizens, commonwealth citizens with the
right of abode in the UK and citizens of any country in the European Economic Area. Id. The
Act is not retrospective and does not apply to any employees who commenced employment
before January 27, 1997. National Council for Voluntary Organisations, Asylum and
Immigration Act 1996, http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/askncvo/index.asp?id=286 (last visited
Mar. 24, 2008) [hereinafter NCVO]. Employers should not carry out any checks on the status
of these employees or ask them to produce any of the documents necessary to establish a defense.
Asylum Act, supra note 21. However, the Act does apply to any previous employees who are
re-employed after this date, regardless of their immigration status when first employed. Id.
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to full and part-time workers whether they are employed on a permanent or
casual basis, and regardless of their status within the employer's business." ' 7
However, this Act does not apply to volunteers." 8
Under this Act, it is lawful to employ "people awaiting the outcome of an
immigration appeal who before their appeal had permission to work or people
who were entitled to work and are awaiting the outcome of a request for an
extension to that permission requested before it ran out."' '" If the employer is
a company, the person responsible for the overall management of the company
may be subject to prosecution. 20
The Asylum Act has two main provisions dealing with the hiring of illegal
immigrants: "an [employer who employs a person, age sixteen or over, is]
guilty of an offense if (1) the employee has not been granted leave to enter or
remain in the United Kingdom; or (2) the employee's leave is not valid ... or
is subject to a condition precluding employment."' 2' An employer is required
"to check [both] the identity and the work authorization of employees and new
122
hires."
This Act introduced the specific offense of hiring persons not authorized
to work in the United Kingdom.123 Unlike the IRCA, the Asylum Act only
provides for civil sanctions against employers.124 Under the Asylum Act, a
person guilty of violation under section 8 "shall be liable on summary
conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale."'2 5 Factors
that can be considered in determining the amount of the penalty are the
"seriousness ofthe offense and the financial circumstances ofthe employer." 21 6

..Asylum Act, supra note 21.
supranote 116.
..
9 Border & Immigration Agency, supranote 116.
120Employers Liabilities, supranote 66; Asylum Act, supra note 21, at 9. Individuals may
118 NCVO,

be held liable if they are "at such a level within the company that they are regarded as being in
overall management and if the offence was committed with their consent or knowledge or
occurred as a result of their negligence." Id.
1 Asylum and Immigration Act, 1996, c. 49, § 8(1) (Eng.).
122 Batog, supra note 106, at 122.
3 Employers Liabilities, supra note 66.
124 Batog, supra note 106, at 122.
125 Asylum and Immigration Act, § 8(4); see also Batog, supra note 106, at 122. An
employer found guilty of a level five offense is subject to a civil fine of up to £5,000 or $9,405.
Id.
126 Asylum Act, supra note 21, at 9.
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Another difference between the Asylum Act and the IRCA is the lack of a
knowledge requirement. 27 Instead, it is an offense to employ an unauthorized2
worker even if the employer did not have knowledge of the worker's status. 1
Employers were provided with a list of acceptable documents to verify that
a worker was authorized to work in the United Kingdom. 29 This list includes
a UK passport or birth certificate, a certificate of registration as a British
citizen, a work permit, or a letter issued by the Home Office confirming that
the person has indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. 3 °
The Home Office is the government department responsible for
enforcement of the Asylum Act. 3 ' The Home Office has enforcement teams
responsible "for a particular catchments areas in the UK."' 31 2 While surprise
raids are not used to detect violations of the Asylum Act, the Home Office
does have a duty to investigate any breaches that are called to its attention.'33
Employers brought to the attention of the Home Office "are in real and
unnecessary risk of investigation by the Home Office."' 34 If any violations are
found, the employer is not only subject to possible prosecution but is also
likely to receive "closer scrutiny of any future 35
application for work permits and
any further dealings with the Home Office."'
The Asylum Act provides for an employer defense to the claim that the
employer hired an unauthorized worker.'36 Ifa valid defense is established, the
employer will not be convicted even if the employee, is in fact, working
without permission and is subject to immigration control. 13'According to the
Act:

127 Ryan,

supra note 7, at 42.

128 Id.

129Id. at 36.
130 See Employers

Liabilities, supra note 66. Other acceptable forms of documentation
include: a document issued by a previous employer stating the named person's National
Insurance Number; a national identity card issued by a European Economic Area Agreement
party-state (EEAA) describing the holder as a national of that state; "a UK residence permit
issued to a national of an EEAA state"; or a letter issued by the Home Office verifying British
citizenship or giving permission to take employment. Id
131Id.
132 Id.
133Id.
134Id.
135Id.
136 See Asylum and Immigration Act, 1996, c. 49, § 8(2) (Eng.).
137 See Border & Immigration Agency, supra note 116.
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it shall be a defence to prove that before the employment began,
there was produced to the employer a document which appeared
to relate to the employee and to be of a description specified in
an order made by the Secretary of State; and either the document
was retained by the employer or a copy or other record of it was
in the order in
made by the employer, in a manner specified
38
relation to documents of that description. 1
This defense will apply if "before their employment commenced, the employer
asked the employee to produce one of the specified documents." 139 The
"document must then have been inspected to ensure that it related to the person
in question, copied and kept on the person's file until at least six months after
their employment ended."' 14 However, this defense is not available where the
employer knew that employing the worker would result in an offense under the
Asylum Act. 14 ' The burden of proof falls on the employer to establish the
validity of the defense, rather than requiring the prosecution to establish the
alleged offense occurred. 142 This has resulted in employers becoming
"Immigration Officers" because "in order to establish a defence, they have to
show that before employment commenced a document was shown to the
employer which: (1) appeared to the employer to relate to the employee; [and]
143
(2) was one of those [listed] by the Secretary of State of the Home Office.',
IV. ANALYSIS: NEW IMMIGRATION REFORM ACTS
A. Why the IRCA of 1986 Did Not Work
As previously mentioned, Congress instituted employer sanctions in an
attempt to deter illegal entry into the United States for the purpose of
However, the "[c]riminalization of the employment
employment.'"
relationship... has not deterred illegal entry."' 45 Numerous reasons are given
as to why the IRCA did not work.

Asylum and Immigration Act, § 8(2).
'3 Asylum Act, supra note 21.
140 Id.
14' Asylum and Immigration Act, § 8(3).
142 See Employers Liabilities, supra note 66.
143 Id.
'44 Medina, supra note 1, at 671.
145 id.
138
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1. Sanctions Not Substantial
One potential cause for the ineffectiveness of the legislation is that the
sanctions were not substantial enough. 146 The fines were too slight to cause
concern for employers who hired undocumented workers. Due to the strong
financial benefit of hiring illegal aliens, "employers would likely recoup the
costs associated with any fines in a very short time due to the cost differential47
between hiring an undocumented worker and a documented worker."'
Because the financial burden placed on employers for hiring undocumented
workers was very mild, the employers did not have a monetary incentive to
comply with the IRCA. In order to increase the success of the IRCA, it
appears that it would be necessary to increase the civil fines and criminal
penalties that were imposed on the employers.
2. Enforcement Issues
a. Lack of Enforcement
Another "problem" with the Act was the lack of enforcement of employer
sanctions."' Figures from the United States Government Accountability
Office state that employers were only issued three citations of intent to fine
in 2004.149 Compare that to 1999 when there were 417 such notices." 0
Various explanations have been offered as to why the law is so rarely
enforced. Some of these include that the IRCA is a weak law because: (1)
there have never been enough resources devoted to maintaining compliance

146 Ehrenpreis,

supra note 11, at 1208, 1218; Shannon Leigh Vivian, Note, Be Our Guest:

A Review of the Legal and Regulatory History of US. ImmigrationPolicy TowardMexico and
Recommendationsfor CombatingEmployerExploitationof Nonimmigrantand Undocumented
Workers, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 189, 207-08 (2005).

117Ehrenpreis, supranote 11, at 1221. A fine as high as $11,000 can easily be recovered by
paying an undocumented worker a substandard salary. Id.
148Id. at 1208.
149 Id.

ISo Id. In 1998, the General Accounting Office (GAO) determined that the INS completed
approximately 6,500 investigations of employers or about 3% ofthe country's estimated number
of employers of unauthorized aliens. In the same report, the GAO found that from 1994 to 1999,
the INS devoted only about 2% of its enforcement workforce to its worksite enforcement
program, which is designed to detect noncompliance with IRCA. Also, the majority of
enforcement actions resulted in only a warning or citation. Actual fines, which typically were
less than $2,500 per company, were levied against only 3,532 employers. Criminal prosecutions
have been extremely rare. Id.at 1209.
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with the law; (2) undocumented workers are a necessary component of certain
industries in order for them to survive; and, (3) the possible harm "of civil
sanctions and criminal penalties is outweighed by the benefit of lower salary
expenses."'' As long as the INS rarely enforces the IRCA, employers have no
incentive to comply with the Act because the chances of enforcement and
prosecution are extremely slim.
b. Inefficiency in Enforcement
Another reason for the ineffectiveness of the Act was the fact that the
process for detecting violations was inefficient. First, there was no automated
system "for maintaining compliance data," which hindered "the initial
inspection strategy deployed by the INS."' 52 Second, the employers that failed
inspection did not have much to fear because they "could negotiate their fine
and the initial inspection left them free to engage in prohibited employment
practices because the INS reviews seldom include reinspection."' 53 Third, the
INS strategy put a focus on large-scale employers or employers "with a history
of hiring undocumented workers."' 54 Therefore, "employers who did not fit
[into] one of these categories [faced] low probability of incurring sanctions."' 5
c. Lack of Experience by the INS
A third problem with the IRCA pertained to the nature of the INS itself.
The INS was given the responsibility of enforcing the IRCA' 5 6 However,
"historically [the INS] had little or no experience in regulating businesses or
employer hiring or firing practices."' 57 Also, the INS was disadvantaged by
"congressional guidelines, lack of [c]ongressional and internal INS political
and fiscal prioritization, and low status in the Justice Department
infrastructure."'5 8 Having a government agency in charge of the enforcement

'

Id. at 1210.

152Espenoza, supranote 13, at 379.
153 Id.

at 380.

154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Sarah M. Kendall, Comment, America's Minorities are Shown the "Back Door"...
Again: The DiscriminatoryImpact of the ImmigrationReform and ControlAct, 18 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 899, 917 (1996).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 917-18. "The INS has been described as one of 'the most beleaguered agencies in
the federal government' because it is, as the House Judiciary Committee described, chronically
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of such important legislation without the necessary background or
infrastructure to be successful in the task delegated to them is not an efficient
way to promote compliance with the Act. In fact it shows that the government,
by not putting an experienced department in charge of monitoring compliance
with the Act, is not serious about enforcing this legislation.
d. Non-Uniformity ofEnforcement
A major part of the inability to adequately monitor compliance with IRCA
is structural.159 With regard to issuing sanctions, the INS did not effectively
coordinate its IRCA policy throughout its national, regional and local
offices. 6 ' Therefore, there was not a centralized enforcement policy between
" ' Without a centralized enforcement policy, different
the different offices.16
regions followed their own enforcement policy, leading to a lack of
uniformity.'62 As long as the various branch offices use different enforcement
policies, the IRCA will continue to be ineffective.
3. Employer Issues
Another problem with the IRCA was employer confusion about INS
expectations. The General Accounting Office concluded that "[b]oth
education and enforcement are necessary for the development of voluntary

'undermanned, ill-equipped, and generally overwhelmed.' " Id. at 918.
"59Id. at 919. "The INS is comprised of thirty-three district offices and twenty-two Border
Patrol sectors." Id.
160

Id.

161

Id.
Id.

162

[T]he western region of the INS uses a quota system for its agents [and] the
number of violations the agents report is linked to performance evaluations
and pay raises. As a result, the western region had a higher instance of
paperwork violations as opposed to actual employment violations. The
eastern region has a different policy, urging their officers to focus on
employers in "knowing hire" violation[s]. Thus, in contrast [to the] western
region, seventy-one percent of eastern [r]egion cases involved the actual
hiring or continued employment of undocumented workers. Generally, there
are great differences in the number and type of cases among the various
regional offices. The western and southern regions produced greater numbers
of smaller cases while the northern and eastern regions produced smaller
numbers of larger cases.
Id. at 919-20.
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compliance.' 6 3 Typically employers that received a visit from the INS had a
higher rate of compliance than employers that were not visited." 6 This
illustrates that employer education about paperwork requirements of the IRCA
results in greater compliance.' 6 5 Going forward, offering education to
employers may increase compliance with the employer sanction provisions.
4. Complexity of the Problem
Additionally, IRCA did not meet its goal due to the complexity of the
illegal immigration problem.'66 The behavior criminalized by IRCA,
' Employment is not the
employment, is highly valued by American society. 67
typical type of behavior that Americans expect would result in the imposition
of criminal sanctions. 6 ' Therefore, due to the tension surrounding the
employment prohibition "prosecutors are reluctant to devote scarce financial
resources to prosecute those who engage in such behaviors, judges are
reluctant to impose serious sanctions, and society is reluctant to support strong
enforcement efforts."'

169

Also adding to the complexity of the problem is the inability to accurately
assess any potential success of the Act. 7 0 Two reasons for this-the difficulty
gathering information on the size of the illegal population and the fact that
different types of undocumented aliens-exist and each may be affected
differently by IRCA. 17
Finally, IRCA only addresses the "pull" factors of migration.' 72 The
continuing presence ofundocumented workers supports the conclusion that the
factors that "push" workers out of their home country may be more significant
than the "pull" by the host country."' 3 Some examples of "push" factors are a
desire for better employment, an increased standard of living, family

163Espenoza, supra note 13, at 377-78.
'" Id. at 378. "The three percent of the employer population who received an INS visit since
the enactment of IRCA reported knowing more about the 1-9 requirements and had a higher rate
of compliance than did employers who did not receive a visit." Id.
165 Id.

" Medina, supra note 1, at 671.
167

Id. at 672.

168

Id.

169
170

Id.
Morales, supra note 38, at 276.

171

Id.

172

Espenoza, supra note 13, at 371.
Id.

173
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reunification, or to flee from tyranny or political oppression. 74 Since the
approach by the IRCA of using employer sanctions to reduce the flow of
undocumented workers does not address or correct these "push" factors, failure
of the Act was likely inevitable.' 75
5. Document Fraud
The presence and use of fraudulent documents remains a significant
limitation of the IRCA even though the Act specifies which documents are
required for employer compliance. 176 In fact, "many employers encourage or
assist in the acceptance or procurement of fraudulent documents."'' 77 Also, the
employer may inadvertently accept fraudulent documents.7 7 Employers often
lack the training or resources necessary to identify false documents.' 79
Therefore, future legislation needs to address the increasing problem of
fraudulent documentation for the IRCA to have even a moderate level of
success.

6. Discrimination
A final problem with the IRCA of 1986 is its discriminatory effect. With
the passage of the Act, "Congress feared that the employer sanctions provision
would create a pattern of discrimination." ' 0 In response to this fear, Congress
adopted the Frank Amendment, which created a special office to investigate
and prove "charges of discrimination based on national origin or citizenship
status."'' In its third report on employer sanctions, the General Accounting

'74
John E. Huerta, Symposium, Strangersto the Constitution:Immigrantsin American Law:
MigrationPolicy andEmployer Sanctions, 44 U. PiTT.L. REv. 507, 509 (1983).
' Espenoza, supra note 13, at 371.
176

Ehrenpreis, supranote 11, at 1210 (quoting Nightline: IllegalImmigrant Workers (ABC

television broadcast Dec. 14, 2004)).
1' Espenoza, supranote 13, at 377.
171 Id Many ofthe credentials that undocumented workers present are produced by obtaining
a valid birth certificate or a social security card belonging to someone else. The undocumented
workers use these documents to obtain a drivers license. Then the employee presents these
documents as proof of work authorization or citizenship. Id.
179 Id.
180

Morales, supra note 38, at 273.

181 ld at 273-74.

This amendment created an office of Special Counsel for Immigration Related
Affair Employment Practices in the Department of Justice .... National

origin is not defined by IRCA, although a significant body of case law and
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Office "found that [the use of] employer sanctions 'had led to widespread
discrimination based' on national origin."' 2 Discrimination caused by the
IRCA is not an acceptable side effect of the legislation. Therefore, in future
attempts, Congress should include stronger provisions protecting against
discriminatory hiring practices.
B. Why the Asylum Act DidNot Work
The United Kingdom passed the Asylum Act in an attempt to deter the
entry of undocumented workers into the country.' 83 However, the Asylum Act
did not prove very successful for several reasons.
1. Lack of Enforcement
One problem surrounding the Asylum Act's implementation is that
prosecution of employers rarely occurred. 4 The low number of prosecutions
is attributable to the fact that "the Immigration Service's focus in the
employment context ... [was] on the detection of unauthorized workers"
rather than on prosecuting violators of the Act. 8 5 Due to the low number of
prosecutions for violations of the Act, employers had no strong incentive to
comply with its provisions. As a result, employer compliance with the Act was
low, rendering it unsuccessful.
2. Fraud
The Asylum Act presented another problem with the use of fraudulent
documents. 8 6 Since introducing employer sanctions, "it has become more

administrative practices have defined the term in the context of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Id. at 274.
82 Id. at 275. "Title VII prohibits [employment discrimination] . . . based on race and
national origin." However, "the Supreme Court in Espinosav. FarahMfg. Co. [(414 U.S. 86
(1973))], held that Title VII does not bar discrimination based on alienage." Id. at 274.
'83
Ryan, supra note 7, at 38; Batog, supra note 106, at 122.
Ryan, supranote 7, at 38; Batog, supranote 106, at 122. "From 1998 to 2002, there were
twenty-two enforcement actions against employers who employed undocumented workers, of
which eight resulted in convictions. In 2002, there were only two enforcement actions and one
conviction. While there are no official statistics for 2003, evidence shows that enforcement has
not increased." Id.
85 Ryan, supra note 7, at 38.
186

Id. at 33-34.
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likely that unauthorized workers will commit criminal offenses by obtaining
employment through the fraudulent use of documents."' 8 7 Because the use of
fraudulent documents has become so prevalent, the attempt to reduce the
number of undocumented workers employed in the United Kingdom was
increasingly more difficult. Therefore, the list of acceptable documents in
future legislation should include documents for which forged copies are more
difficult to obtain.
3. DiscriminatoryEffect
Like the IRCA, the use of employer sanctions may have had a
discriminatory effect on ethnic minorities.'8 8 To help ease the potential for
discrimination the Asylum Act states that, "where employers decide to make
checks on entitlement to take work, the same checks will need to be applied to
'
Also, the government proposed
all applicants whatever their background."189
guidelines that included "advice on how to carry out checks on applicants in
ways which do not discriminate, or risk accusation of discrimination against
any group. ' However, despite these actions by the government, it is not
clear whether they were successful in curbing potential discrimination. 19'
Nevertheless, the Commission for Racial Equality opposed the use ofemployer
sanctions due to its tendency toward discriminatory effects.' 92
4. BroadList of Acceptable Documents
The Asylum Act provides for an expansive list of acceptable documents to
prove legal worker status.'9' One problem with the broad list is that it includes
documents that do not require a photograph, making them particularly
susceptible to forgery."" Another problem with the list is that it includes

"' Id. at 34. There are two different cases regarding the use of fraudulent documentation.
One is the presentation of a valid document that relates to someone else. The second is the
presentation of a forged document.
188Id. at 36.
189 Id. at 37.
190 Id.
191

See generally id.

192 Id.

191Id. at 36.
194 Id. This category included British and Irish birth certificates and letters from the
immigration or employment authorities. Id. at 36-37.
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documents having a national insurance number. 9' 5 However, these documents
do not necessarily prove a current entitlement to work because the worker can
obtain a number during a previous period of lawful employment. 9 6 Therefore,
as previously mentioned, future legislation needs to contain a list of acceptable
documents that are not ineffective or easily forged.
5. Burden Upon Employers
Another problem with the Asylum Act is the potential burden placed on
employers by the sanctions.' 97 In response to this problem, the government
included a broad employer defense provision.'9" Also, to alleviate concerns
regarding potential impact on businesses, the Asylum Act now allows
documents bearing the national insurance number to be sufficient for the
employer defense.' 99 However, the Act did not fail because the sanctions were
too onerous on the employers. Rather, other reasons such as low enforcement
rates and the use of fraudulent documents led to the Act's failure to meet its
stated goals.
6. Lack ofAdequate Data
Finally, the Act did not meet its goal because of the problems posed by
undocumented workers. Adding to this problem is the difficulty of obtaining
accurate data concerning undocumented workers.2"' The Home Office also has
some data source issues including a lack of specified data, limited data,
inaccessible centrally held data, and limited data dissemination.20 ' Until the
Home Office is better able to obtain accurate data, it will continue to be
difficult to assess the success of the Asylum Act and any future legislation.

'9' Id. at 37. This category, in addition to including national insurance cards, permitted
reliance upon any document issued by a previous employer that contained a national insurance
number, such as a payslip or a document giving evidence of taxes collected by the employer.
Id.
196

Id.

197 Id.

" Id. at 38.

199 Id.
20 Emma

Stewart, Deficiencies in UK Asylum Data:Practicaland TheoreticalChallenges,

17 J. REFUGEE STUD. 29 (2004).
2o"Id. at 31.
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C. What Now-The United States and United Kingdom Introduce New
Legislation
In response to the continuing problem of undocumented workers, both the
United States and the United Kingdom have introduced new legislation.
1. UnitedStates-H.R. 4437 andS. 1348
In the United States, immigration reform legislation has been introduced in
Congress. The House of Representative's Bill, H.R. 4437, is tentatively titled
"Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act
of 2005. '' 22 The Senate Bill, S. 1348, is tentatively titled "Comprehensive
Immigration Reform Act of 2007. "23

Both of the bills contain major modifications to the original IRCA.
However, the focus of this analysis will be the provisions relating to the
employment verification process and the potential civil and criminal penalties
facing employers who fail to comply with the bills.
Both H.R. 4437 and S. 1348 have an employment verification process
requirement. Pursuant to H.R. 4437, the Secretary of Homeland Security will
establish a verification system whereby staff will respond to inquiries made
through a toll-free telephone number or other toll-free electronic media with
respect to both an individual's identity and his authorization to be employed.2 "
This system is designed to maximize reliability and ease of use by
employers.2 °5
According to S. 1348, the Secretary of Homeland Security must institute an
electronic verification system to determine whether the information submitted
by the employee matches the information maintained by the Secretary of
Homeland Security and to verify that the employee is eligible to work in the
United States.2 " 6

Both bills also increase employer civil sanctions and criminal penalties. In
H.R. 4377, the civil penalties range from $5,000 to $40,000.207 The range for

202 Border Protection Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of2005, H.R. 4437,

109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005), availableat http://www.judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/HR4437.
pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
203Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007), available
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s 110-1348 (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
204 H.R. 4437, § 701(a)(7)(A).
205 Id. § 701(a)(7)(D).
206 S. 1348, § 301(d)(l).
207 H.R. 4437, § 706(1).
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the first violation is not less than $5,000 and not more than $7,500 for each
alien."0 8 The range for a second violation is not less than $10,000 and not more
than $15,000 for each alien.20 9 The range for three or more violations is not
less than $25,000 and not more than $40,000 for each alien.2" 0 The civil
penalties for paperwork violations range from $1,000 to $25,000 for each
individual.2 1'
The civil sanctions for hiring undocumented workers in S. 1348 ranges
from $500 to $20,000.12 The penalty for a first offense should not be less than
$500 nor more than $4,000 for each unauthorized alien.213 The civil penalty
for a second offense ranges from not less than $4,000 to not more than $10,000
for each alien.21 4 The penalty for three or more offenses can not be less than
$6,000 nor more than $20,000.215 The civil penalties for paperwork violations
range from $200 to $6,000 for each violation.21 6
Both bills also contain criminal penalty provisions. In H.R. 4437, any
employer who has a pattern or practice of employing undocumented workers
is subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for each alien, imprisonment of
not less than one year, or both. 17 In S. 1348, any employer with a pattern or
practice of employing undocumented workers shall be subject to a civil fine of
not more than $20,000, imprisonment of not more than three years, or both.218
2. United Kingdom-Immigration,Asylum, and NationalityAct 2006
The United Kingdom passed the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act
2006 (IANA) repealing section 8 of the original Asylum Act.2 9 The focus of
this section will be the employer sanction provisions of the LANA, which
include both civil fines and criminal penalties.

208

Id. § 706(l)(B).

209 Id. § 706(l)(C).
210 Id. § 706(l)(D).

21 Id. § 706(2)(B)-(C).
212 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of2007, S. 1348, 1 10th Cong. § 301 (e)(4)(A)(a)

(2007).
213 Id. § 301(e)(4)(A)(a)(i).
214 Id. § 301(e)(4)(A)(a)(ii).
215 Id. § 301(e)(4)(a)(iii).
216 Id. § 301(e)(4)(B)(i)-(iii).
217 Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of2005, H.R. 4437,
109th Cong. § 706(4)(1) (1st Sess. 2005).
218 S. 1348, § 301(f)(1).
219 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, 2006, c. 13, § 26 (Eng.), availableat http://
www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts2006/ukpga.20060013_en.pdf.
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Under the IANA, the Secretary of State is in charge of issuing penalties for
violations of the Act.220 In regard to civil sanctions, if the employer fails to
comply with the IANA, the Secretary oft State may require the employer to pay
a penalty that cannot exceed £2,000.22
The IANA also contains a provision containing criminal penalties. An
employer may be subject to criminal penalties for "knowingly" hiring an
employee that is subject to immigration control.222 If an employer is guilty of
an offense under this provision, they
shall be liable - on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for
a term not exceeding two years, to a fine, or to both, or on
summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12
months in England and Wales or 6 months in Scotland or
Northern Ireland, a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or
to both.223
D. Which One Will Be More Successful?
Both United States bills, H.R. 4437 and S. 1348, and the United Kingdom's
LANA include provisions that show some promise of success. However, both
countries' legislation also have provisions that appear to be detrimental to the
goal of reducing the number of undocumented workers.
1. US. Bills
a. H.R. 4437
H.R. 4437 contains some provisions that will help to curb the hiring of
illegal aliens. The most important change made to the new bill from the IRCA
of 1986 is the increase in civil fines and criminal penalties. As previously
mentioned, under the IRCA, employers did not have a strong incentive to
comply because the sanctions did not have much power behind them and the
benefits of hiring undocumented workers outweighed the detriment of the
employer sanctions. Increasing employer sanctions is a positive step toward
reducing the number of undocumented workers employed in the United States.

220 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, § 15(2).
221 Id.; Ryan, supra note 7, at 41.
222
223

Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, § 21(1).
Id. § 21(2).

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 36:475

Another positive attribute of H.R. 4437 is that it replaces the 1-9 with an
employer verification system.2 4 Setting up this electronic system is beneficial
in two ways. First, it provides a means for employers to more accurately
assess whether a potential employee may legally work in this country. The
employer may not have enough education to know whether the documents
presented by the potential employee are satisfactory, so the new verification
system may prove invaluable to employers. Second, the electronic system will
help cut down on the problem of fraudulent documents, therefore reducing one
of the major problems with the IRCA of 1986.
However, there are also provisions that may prove detrimental to the
success of the bill. One such provision is that "[i]f the person or other entity
has received a final nonverification regarding an individual, the person or
'
The use of "may"
entity may terminate employment of the individual."225
instead of "shall" indicates that the employer has the choice of whether to
terminate employment. This construction is an open invitation to nonenforcement of the Act. H.R. 4437 does not say that the employer must
terminate the employee, yet it requires notification of the employer's decision
be given to the Department of Homeland Security.226 This provision may
weaken the enforcement of the Act.
Another potential weakness of H.R. 4437 is that employers will not be
required to use the employee verification system until six years after the
enactment of the bill.227 Therefore, if the bill is enacted, the problem of
undocumented workers may still be prevalent for at least another six years
until employers are forced to comply with the worker verification system.
Another issue with H.R. 4437 is the provision for mitigation of civil
monetary penalties for smaller employers.22 The reduction of civil penalties
may be up to as much as 60%.229 However, it is important to note that small
businesses represent more than 99% of all employers and provide about 75%
of all new net jobs.2 3' Therefore, most workers are employed by small
businesses. By allowing small business to mitigate the civil penalties,
therefore reducing the "cost" of hiring undocumented workers, the employers

224 Compare H.R. 4437, 109th Cong., § 702 (1st Sess. 2005), with 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West

2006).
225 H.R. 4437,

§ 702(5) (emphasis added).

226

Id.

227
228

Id. § 703(b).
Id. § 706(10).

229

Id.

230 JEFFRY A. TIMMONS & STEPHEN SPINELLI, NEW VENTURE CREATION: ENTREPRENEURSHIP

FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 5 (2004).
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who are potentially hiring the most illegal aliens face a lower cost than larger
companies. By allowing smaller businesses to alleviate their costs, the true
"bite" of H.R. 4437 is only affecting about 1% of businesses. This low
percentage is likely to lesson H.R. 4437's impact on the hiring of illegal aliens.
" ' Defining
A final issue with the H.R. 4437 is the "good faith" provision.23
exactly what constitutes "acting in good faith" is difficult. "Good faith" is a
vague term and without providing for a more concrete definition this provision
allows too much discretion in the enforcement of the employer sanctions.
b. S. 1348
S. 1348 also contains promising provisions. First, it increases the amount
of employer sanctions from the previous IRCA. Increasing sanctions is an
important step toward achieving more compliance by employers.
Second, S. 1348 also institutes an employer verification system.2 32 As
previously mentioned, the use of this system will help more employers comply
with the bill and will also help to cut down on the use of fraudulent documents.
Third, unlike H.R. 4437, if the employee receives nonconfirmation of their
ability to work legally in the United States, the employer must terminate the
"employment, recruitment, or referral ofthe individual. 2 33 Also, the employer
must notify the Secretary of Homeland Defense. 234 Therefore, this provision
helps to promote enforcement of S. 1348 by making the termination of the
employee mandatory rather than optional.
Another promising provision in S. 1348 is § 301(g) which allows the
adjustment of penalties for inflation: "[A]ll penalties and limitations on
recovery of costs and attorney's fees in this section shall be increased every 4
years beginning January 2010. ",235 This is an important provision because it
will keep the bill current, with the penalties continually being adjusted upward
231 This provision states that:

In the case of imposition of a civil penalty... with respect to a violation...
for hiring or continuation of employment or recruitment or referral by person
or entity .

.

. and in the case of imposition of a civil penalty .

.

. for a

violation.., for hiring or recruitment or referral by a person or entity, the
penalty otherwise imposed shall be waived if the violator establishes that it
was the first such violation of such provision by the violator and the violator
acted in goodfaith.
H.R. 4437, § 706( 1) (emphasis added).
232 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 11 0th Cong., § 301 (d) (2007).
233 Id. § 301(d)(8)(D)(x).
234 Id.
235 Id. § 301(g).
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due to inflation. Therefore, the penalties will not become less burdensome as
time goes on.
Finally, unlike H.R. 4437, under S. 1348, the electronic employment
verification system requirement becomes effective eighteen months after it is
available to implement. 36 Allowing employers eighteen months gives them
sufficient time to update operations and prepare to use the electronic system,
while simultaneously avoiding such a delay that the effectiveness of curbing
undocumented workers is hampered.
Along with these positive provisions, there are also some provisions that
may hinder the success of the bill. S. 1348 also contains a "good faith
provision" stating that "an employer that establishes that the employer has
complied [in good faith with the requirements] has established an affirmative
defense ....
,237 As previously mentioned, "good faith" is a very vague and
subjective term. The bill does not specify exactly what actions constitute a
"good faith" effort. Therefore, this aspect of the bill gives too much discretion
to the Secretary of Homeland Security. An important part of the success of the
bill is for it to be written as objectively as possible to allow for greater
uniformity in enforcement. Allowing this much discretion to enter into the bill
may lead to a lack of uniformity in the enforcement of S. 1348.
Another negative aspect of S. 1348 is that its penalties are less than
H.R. 4437. In order for it to have a chance of success, the employer sanctions
must be severe enough to deter employers from hiring illegal aliens. In other
words, the penalties must be so a high that the benefit of hiring illegal
immigrants is less than the burden of the employer sanctions. The reduced
sanctions of S.1348 do not have the same impact as H.R. 4377 and therefore
may not be sufficient to meet the goal of this legislation.
2. UK Act
Like H.R. 4377 and S.1348, the LANA contains some provisions that show
promise for success. Under the LANA, the Secretary of State is charged with
compiling a list of factors that must be considered in determining the amount
of the penalty.23 Included in these factors is the employer's ability to pay the
fine.239 This is an important provision because it allows the Secretary of State

Id. § 301(d)(2).
Id. § 301(a)(4)(A).
238 Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Act, 2006, c. 13, § 19(1) (Eng.).
239 Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Bill, 2006, H.L. Bill [74] (U.K.), availableathttp://
236

237

www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/6353/18383/18469/draftcivilpenalties.pdf.
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to tailor the amount of the fine based on the employer's circumstances.
Therefore, companies with deep pockets that may not initially face a high
financial burden by employing illegal aliens, may have that burden increased
based on their ability to pay. Using a company's size to assess the appropriate
penalty should aid the goal of deterring the hiring of illegal aliens.
Another promising provision in the IANA requires that the employer check
the employee's worker status during the course of employment: it "require[s]
action to be taken at specified intervals or on specified occasions during the
course of employment."24 This is in contrast to the Asylum Act which only
" ' Requiring periodic
required an initial check before employment began.24
checks of an employee's status should help to lessen the number of
undocumented workers.
Another important aspect of the IANA is that it allows for the Home Office
to create a helpline to help employers understand who may legally work and
who may not.242 This is important to the goal of reducing the number of
undocumented workers hired and working in the UK. Offering the employers
this useful education will help reduce the number of working illegal aliens and
also help lessen the effectiveness of the employer's defense that he did not
knowingly employ an illegal alien.
There are, however, some weak provisions in the Act. The first states "the
secretary of state may give an employer who acts contrary to this section a
notice requiring him to pay a penalty of a specified amount not exceeding the
prescribed maximum."24' 3 Not making the imposition of a penalty mandatory
implies that this law may not be strictly enforced. To give the IANA more
strength, the penalty should be mandatory.
Second, the IANA still allows the same identification documents as the
Asylum Act. Therefore, the IANA does not address the issue of the use of
fraudulent documents. The LANA should have either a new verification system
in place or include a list of acceptable documents which are more difficult to
forge.
Finally, the IANA reduces the maximum amount of penalties. The Asylum
Act allowed for civil fines of up to £5,000. However, the IANA only provides
for civil fines of up to £2,000.2' Since the Asylum Act was not very
240 Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Act, § 15(7)(e).
24! Asylum and Immigration Act, 1996, c. 49, § 8(2)(a) (Eng.).
242 Immigration Law Practioners' Association, Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill -

HL Bill 43, http://www.ilpa.org.uk/briefings/IAN2005briefloftLGrandCteeEmployment.doc (last
visited Mar. 24, 2008).
243 Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Act, § 15(2) (emphasis added).
244 Asylum and Immigration Act, § 8(4); Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Act, § 15(2);
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successful with civil penalties ranging up to £5,000, it does not follow that the
IANA will be any more successful with fines that are even more modest.
Because the potential monetary burden on the employer is reduced, the
employer has less incentive to comply with the IANA.
Although both countries' new legislation, H.R. 4377 and S. 1348 in the
United States and the IANA in the United Kingdom, have their respective
strengths and weaknesses, the U.S. bills appear to be better suited to reducing
the problem of undocumented workers being employed by businesses. The
U.S. bills have harsher penalties both with regard to civil fines and criminal
penalties. Also, in the U.S. bills, attempts have been made to reduce the use
of fraudulent documents and to provide employers with more education to be
able to detect illegal workers. Both of these issues were major problems with
the previous IRCA of 1986.
V. CONCLUSION

This Note addressed attempts by both the United States and the United
Kingdom to reduce the problem of illegal immigration through the introduction
of new immigration reform acts. In conclusion, when comparing both the
strengths and weaknesses of the new legislation, the U.S. bills will be more
successful in solving the increasing problem of undocumented workers being
employed by businesses.
Based on analysis of the main provisions of both countries' legislation, the
U.S. bills are better suited to meet the goal of reducing the number of illegal
immigrants employed.
The U.S. bills offer harsher penalties for
noncompliance with the legislation and take affirmative steps towards reducing
the use of fraudulent documents.
The future of immigration reform legislation in the United States is still
somewhat uncertain. The country is still awaiting a comprehensive
immigration reform law containing provisions relating to the imposition of
employer sanctions for hiring illegal aliens. Therefore, in passing a new law
dealing with employer sanctions, the United States should institute the higher
penalties of H.R. 4377, the employment verification systems of both bills, a
must-terminate provision that requires employers to terminate employees who
are found to be illegal, and implement the verification requirements within
eighteen months of the passage of the new Act. The new law should also
delete the vague good faith defense and the penalty reduction for small
businesses.

Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Bill, H.L. Bill [74].
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Although the IANA does make some important changes, such as having
employers continually monitor their workers' legal status and instituting
imprisonment as a penalty in some situations for noncompliance, the reduction
of the civil fine amount and the discretion given to the Secretary of State on
whether to require a penalty are detrimental to the potential success of the bill.
Therefore, when all of the major provisions, both good and bad are considered,
the U.S. bills seem better poised to have the most impact in curbing the number
of undocumented workers employed by businesses.

